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Abstract
We present a simple strongly universal innocent game model for Levy–Longo trees, i.e. every
point in the model is the denotation of a unique Levy–Longo tree. The observational quotient
of the model then gives a universal, and hence fully abstract, model of the pure Lazy Lambda
Calculus.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents a strongly universal innocent game model for Levy–Longo trees
[11,12] (i.e. every point in the model is the denotation of a unique Levy–Longo tree).
We consider arenas in the sense of [8,14] in which questions may justify either ques-
tions or answers, but answers may only justify questions; and we say that an answer
(respectively question) is pending in a justi9ed sequence if no question (respectively
answer) is explicitly justi9ed by it. Plays are justi9ed sequences that satisfy the stan-
dard conditions of Visibility and Well-Bracketing, and a new condition, which is a
kind of dual of Well-Bracketing, called
Persistence: Every question is explicitly justi9ed by the last pending answer, pro-
vided a pending answer exists at that point; otherwise it is explicitly justi9ed by a
question.
We then consider conditionally copycat strategies, which are innocent strategies
(in the sense of [8]) that behave in a copycat fashion as soon as an O-answer is followed
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by a P-answer. Together with a condition called Relevance, we prove that the recursive
such strategies give a strongly universal model of Levy–Longo trees i.e. every strategy
is the denotation of a unique Levy–Longo tree. To our knowledge, this is the 9rst
universal model of Levy–Longo trees. The observational quotient of the model then
gives a universal and fully abstract model of the pure Lazy Lambda Calculus [3,15].
1.1. Related work
Universal (game) models for the Lazy Lambda Calculus with convergence test were
9rst presented in [2,13]. The model studied in the former is in the AJM style [1], while
that in the latter, by McCusker, is based on an innocent-strategy [8] universal model
for call-by-name FPC, and is obtained via a universal and fully abstract translation
from the Lazy Lambda Calculus into call-by-name FPC. The present paper considers
the pure (i.e. without any constant) Lazy Lambda Calculus. Our model builds on what
is essentially McCusker’s model by adding three constraints: Persistence, which is a
constraint on plays, and Conditional Copycat and Relevance, which are constraints on
strategies. Indeed ours is a submodel of McCusker’s (see Remark 12).
The 9rst fully abstract (game) model of the pure Lazy Lambda Calculus was con-
structed by the second author in [6]. The strategies therein are history-free and satisfy a
monotonicity condition. The model is not universal (there are 9nite monotone strategies
that are not denotable). However we believe it is possible to achieve universality by in-
troducing a condition similar to Relevance. In [9,10] game models based on e;ectively
almost-everywhere copycat (or EAC) strategies are constructed which are strongly uni-
versal for Nakajima trees and BIohm trees, respectively. Several local structure results
for AJM-style game models can be found in [7].
2. Arenas, legal positions and nested levels
We begin this section by introducing a formal setting for playing games called are-
nas. Legal positions are then introduced as justi9ed sequences (which are sequences of
moves with pointers) that satisfy three conditions, namely, Visibility, Well-Bracketing
and Persistence. The second part of the section is about nested levels of sequences of
questions and answers, a notion useful for several technical proofs in the sequel.
2.1. Arenas and legal positions
An arena is a triple A= 〈MA; A;A〉 where MA is a set of moves; A :MA→{PQ;PA,
OQ;OA} is a labelling function that indicates whether a given move is a P-move or an
O-move, and whether it is a question (Q) or an answer (A); and A⊆ (MA+{∗})×MA
(where ∗ is a dummy move), called justi>cation relation (we read m1 A m2 as
“m1 justi9es m2”), satis9es the following axioms:
for m;m′; mi ranging over MA:
(1) For each m∈MA, there is a unique m− ∈MA + {∗} such that m− A m; in case
∗ A m, we call m initial.
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(2) Every initial move is an O-question.
(3) If mA m′ then m and m′ are moves by diOerent players.
(4) If mA m′ and m is an answer then m′ is a question (“Answers may only justify
questions.”).
It is useful to think of the justi9cation relation A (restricted to MA×MA) as de9ning
the edge-set of a vertex-labelled directed graph whose vertex-set is MA. We shall refer
to the graph as the arena graph of A.
We use square and round parentheses in bold type as meta-variables for moves as
follows:
O-question P-answer P-question O-answer
[ ] ( )
We write M InitA for the set of initial moves of A, and write (−) for the function that
inverts the P=O-designation of a move, so that e.g. PQ=OQ and OA=PA, etc.
The simplest arena is the empty arena 1= 〈∅; ∅; ∅〉. Let A and B be arenas. The
product arena A×B is just the disjoint union of the arena graphs of A and B. Formally
we have
MA×B = MA +MB;
A×B = [A; B];
∗ A×B m ⇔ ∗ A m ∨ ∗ B m;
m A×B n ⇔ m A n ∨ m B n:
Given an arena A, we write PA for the graph that is obtained from the arena graph
of A by inverting the P=O-label at each vertex. As an operation on arena graphs, the
function space arena A⇒B is obtained from the arena graph of B by grafting a copy
of PA just under each initial move b of B (so that each tree of PA is a subtree of b).
Formally we have
MA⇒B = MA ×M InitB +MB;
A⇒B = [1 ; A; B]
and A⇒B is de9ned by
∗ A⇒B b ⇔ ∗ B b;
b A⇒B (a; b′) ⇔ b = b′ ∧ ∗ A a;
(a; b) A⇒B (a′; b′) ⇔ b = b′ ∧ a A a′;
b A⇒B b′ ⇔ b B b′:
Note that we shall refer to a move of the form (a; b)∈MA⇒B simply as a copy of a.
The lifted arena A⊥ is obtained from A by adding two moves, namely, q, which is
the new initial move, and a, which is a P-answer, such that q justi9es a which justi9es
each initial move of A, and moves from A inherit the relation A.
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A justi>ed sequence over an arena A is a 9nite sequence of alternating moves such
that, except the 9rst move which is initial, every move m has a justi>cation pointer
(or simply pointer) to some earlier move m− satisfying m− A m; we say that m is
explicitly justi>ed by m−. A question (respectively answer) in a justi9ed sequence s
is said to be pending just in case no answer (respectively question) in s is explicitly
justi9ed by it. This extends the standard meaning of “pending questions” to “pending
answers”. Recall the de9nition of the P-view psq of a justi9ed sequence s:
pq = ;
psmq = psqm if m is a P-move;
psmq = m if m is initial;
psm0umq = psqm0m if the O-move m is explicitly justi9ed by m0:
In psm0umq the pointer from m to m0 is retained, similarly for the pointer from m in
psmq in case m is a P-move. The de9nition of the O-view xsy of a justi9ed sequence
s is obtained from the above de9nition of P-view by swapping P and O.
Denition 1. A justi9ed sequence s over A is said to be a legal position (or play) just
in case it satis9es:
(1) Visibility: Every P-move (respectively non-initial O-move) is explicitly justi9ed by
some move that appears in the P-view (respectively O-view) at that point.
(2) Well-Bracketing: Every answer is explicitly justi9ed by the last pending question
at that point.
(3) Persistence: Every question is explicitly justi9ed by the last pending answer, pro-
vided there is one such at that point, otherwise it is explicitly justi9ed by a question.
For example in the following justi9ed sequence:
[ ( [ ] ) ] [ (:
Persistence requires that the last move “(” be explicitly justi9ed by “)”. For another
example, take the following justi9ed sequence that satis9es Persistence:
[ ( ) ( [ (:
The last “(” must be explicitly justi9ed by one of the two “[”; it may not be explicitly
justi9ed by “)”.
Remark 2. (i) Except for Persistence, all that we have introduced so far are standard
notions of the innocent approach to Game Semantics in the sense of [8]. Note that there
can be at most one pending O-answer (respectively P-answer) in a P-view (respectively
O-view). It is an immediate consequence of Well-Bracketing that no question may be
answered more than once in a legal position.
(ii) It is a consequence of the de9nition that in an odd-length (respectively even-
length) legal position, the last pending question (if any) is an O-question (respectively
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P-question), and the last pending answer (if any) is an O-answer (respectively
P-answer).
(iii) As a consequence of Persistence, if a question in a legal position is explicitly
justi9ed by an answer, the answer must be pending at that point.
Persistence may be regarded as a dual of Well-Bracketing: it is to questions what
Well-Bracketing is to answers. The eOect of Persistence is that, whenever there is a
pending O-answer, a strategy is restricted in which question it can ask, or equivalently
over which argument it can interrogate, at that point (of course it may decide to answer
an O-question instead). An apparently similar restriction on the behaviour of strategies
is captured by the rigidity condition introduced by Danos and Harmer [5], namely, for
any legal position of a rigid strategy, the pointer from a question is to some move
that appears in the R-view of the play at that point. However since Persistence is a
constraint on plays consisting of answers that may justify questions, whereas rigidity
is a condition on strategies over arenas whose answers do not justify any move, it is
not immediately obvious how the two notions are related.
2.2. Nested levels
Take any set M that is equipped with a function  :M→{Q;A} which labels
elements as either questions or answers. Let s be a 9nite sequence of elements from
M—call s a dialogue. The nested level of a dialogue is closely related to the number
of pending questions at that point. Formally, set #qn(s) and #ans(s) respectively to be
the number of questions and the number of answers in s; following [6], we de9ne the
nested level at sm (or simply the level of m whenever s is understood) to be
NL(sm)=
{
− 1 if m is a question;
 if m is an answer;
where =#qn(sm)− #ans(sm); we de9ne NL()= 0. Take, for example, the dialogue
[ ( ) ( [ ] [ ( ) ] ) ( ) ] [ (:




2 [ ] [ ]
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
0 [ ] [
For l¿0, we write s  l to mean the subsequence of s consisting of moves at level l.
We state some basic properties of nested levels of dialogues.
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Lemma 3. In the following, we let s range over dialogues:
(i) For any s= umm′, if m and m′ are at di;erent levels l and l′, respectively, then
m and m′ are either both questions (in which case l′= l + 1) or both answers
(in which case l′= l− 1). As a corollary we have:
(i′) If a and b in a dialogue are at levels l1 and l2, respectively, then for any
l16l6l2, there is some move between a and b (inclusive) at level l.
(ii) For any l¿0, if l¡NL(s) (respectively l¿NL(s)) then the last move in s at
level l, if it exists, is a question (respectively answer).
(iii) Suppose s begins with a question. For each l, if s  l is non-empty, the >rst
element is a question, thereafter the elements alternate strictly between answers
and questions.
Proof. (i): By a straightforward question–answer case analysis of m and m′.
(ii): Take an m which is the last in s at level l¡NL(s). The element m′ (say) after
m in s is at a level not equal to l, which must be l + 1; for if it were l − 1, by
(i′), there must be some move after m′ at level l, which contradicts the assumption
that m is the last such. The required result then follows from (i). The other case is
symmetrical.
(iii): We prove by induction on the length |s| of s. The base case of |s|=0 is trivial.
For the inductive case, take sm such that NL(s)= l and NL(sm)= l+ 1; by (i) above,
m is a question. Suppose s  (l+ 1) is non-empty, the last move m′ (say) by (ii) must
be an answer. We leave the other cases of NL(sm)= l and l − 1 to the reader as an
easy exercise.
We shall see shortly that the notion of nested level is useful for proving the com-
positionality of strategies. Note that Lemma 3 holds for dialogues in general—there
is no assumption of justi9cation relation or pointers, nor of the distinction between
P and O.
Before we conclude the section, we prove another result about nested levels. Unlike
the 9rst, this result concerns dialogues that are equipped with justi9cation pointers.
First we introduce anonymous arenas which are arenas except that the moves are
not designated as either P- or O-moves. Formally an anonymous arena is a structure
〈M; ; 〉 such that M is a set,  :M→{Q; A} is a map that labels each element of M
as either a question (Q) or an answer (A), and ⊆ (M + {∗})×M is a relation that
satis9es axioms (1) and (4) of justi9cation relations, and (2′): Every initial move is a
question. Note that an anonymous arena is just an arena graph except that its vertices
are labelled by either Q or A.
A dialogue with pointers over an anonymous arena 〈M; ; 〉 is a 9nite sequence of
elements of M in which each element m, except the 9rst which is initial, is equipped
with a pointer to some earlier element m− in the sequence such that m−  m. The
prime examples of dialogues with pointers are legal positions and interaction sequences
(which we shall introduce in the following section). Note that it is clear what it means
for a question (or an answer) in a dialogue with pointers to be pending; note also
that as conditions for dialogues with pointers, Well-Bracketing and Persistence are
well-de9ned.
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Lemma 4. Let sm be a dialogue with pointers over an anonymous arena 〈M; ; 〉.
Suppose sm satis>es Well-Bracketing and Persistence:
(i) The pending questions in sm are the last moves in s at a level l¡NL(sm), together
with m if m is a question. Symmetrically the pending answers in sm are the last
moves in s at a level l¿NL(sm) together with m if m is an
answer.
(ii) For any l¿0, if the segment ab appears in sm  l then b is explicitly justi>ed
by a.
Proof. We prove both parts by induction on the length |s| of s. The base case of
|s|=0 is trivial. For the inductive case, we reason by cases. Take s= uq and suppose
q and m are question moves. By the induction hypothesis and by Lemma 3(i′), the
last pending answer in uq, if it exists, is the last move a in uq at level NL(uq) + 1.
Since by Persistence m is explicitly justi9ed by a and since NL(uqm)=NL(uq) + 1,
it follows that (i) and (ii) hold. All the remaining cases, i.e. when one or both the
moves m and q are answer moves, can be proved in a similar, or simpler, way.
3. Conditionally copycat strategies and relevance
This section introduces a Cartesian closed category L whose objects are arenas and
whose maps are innocent strategies that satisfy two new conditions: Conditionally
Copycat and Relevance.
3.1. Innocence and conditionally copycat
Recall that a P-strategy (or simply strategy)  for a game A is de9ned to be a
non-empty, pre9x-closed set of legal positions of A satisfying:
(1) For any even-length s∈ , if sm is a legal position then sm∈ .
(2) (Determinacy). For any odd-length s, if sm and sm′ are in  then m=m′.
A strategy is said to be innocent [8] if whenever even-length sm∈  then for any
odd-length s′ ∈  such that psq= ps′q, we have s′m∈ . That is to say,  is completely
determined by a partial function f (say), which maps P-views p to justi>ed P-moves
(i.e. f(p) is a P-move together with a pointer to some move in p). We write f
for the minimal such function that de9nes . We say that an innocent strategy  is
compact just in case f is a 9nite function (or equivalently  contains only 9nitely
many even-length P-views).
Denition 5. We say that an innocent strategy  is conditionally copycat (or simply
CC) if for any odd-length P-view p∈  in which there is an O-answer which is
immediately followed by a P-answer (i.e. p has the shape “· · · )] · · ·”), then pm∈ 
for some P-move m which is explicitly justi9ed by the penultimate O-move in p.
CC strategies can be characterized as follows.
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Lemma 6 (CC). An innocent strategy  is CC if and only if for every even-length
P-view p in  that has the shape u)0]0v
(1) for any O-move m, if pm∈  then pmm′ ∈  for some P-move m′, and
(2) the sequence )0]0v is a copycat block of moves, i.e. it has the form
a0b0a1b1 · · · anbn
and
(a) for each i6n, the P-move bi is a question i; the preceding O-move ai is a
question
(b) for each i¡n, bi explicitly justi>es ai+1 (and does so uniquely), and each ai
explicitly justi>es bi+1 (and does so uniquely).
In other words )0]0v is an interleaving of two sequences v1 and v2, such that in
each vi, each element (except the >rst) is explicitly justi>ed by the preceding
element in the other sequence.
Proof. The ⇐-direction is straightforward. We prove the other direction. We omit the
proof of (1) as it is obvious. Since p is a P-view, an+1 must be justi9ed by bn. By
CC, bn+1 must be justi9ed by an. It follows that (2b) holds.
We prove (2a) by induction on the length |v| of v. The base case of |v|=0 is
obvious. Now take any even-length P-view p where the corresponding v has length
2n+ 2. We shall consider all possible cases.
If an is an answer, by the induction hypothesis so is bn, and since an answer can
only justify a question, an+1 must be an O-question; and bn+1 must be a P-question
because of Well-Bracketing.
If an is a question, by the induction hypothesis so is bn, now if an+1 is a question
then so is bn+1 because of Well-Bracketing; on the other hand, if an+1 is an answer
then so is bn+1 because of Persistence.
The three cases considered are as follows:
(1) u)0]0a1b1 · · · )n]n[n+1(n+1;
(2) u)0]0a1b1 · · · [n(n[n+1(n+1;
(3) u)0]0a1b1 · · · [n(n)n+1]n+1.
3.2. Composition of strategies
For arenas A1, A2 and A3, a local sequence over (A1; A2; A3) is a sequence u of
elements from the set MA1 +MA2 +MA3 such that every element m in u other than the
9rst (which must be initial in A3) has a pointer to some earlier element m− satisfying:
(1) for i=1; 2, if m is initial in Ai then m− is initial in Ai+1
(2) if m is non-initial in Ai, then m− is in Ai and m− Ai m
further u satis9es locality: If m′ and m′′ occur consecutively in s such that m′ ∈MAi
and m′′ ∈MAj then |i − j|61. We write L(A1; A2; A3) for the set of local sequences
over (A1; A2; A3).
Now suppose  and  are strategies over arenas A⇒B and B⇒C, respectively. The
set of interaction sequences arising from  and , written ISeq(; ), consists of local
sequences u∈L(A; B; C) such that
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(i) u  (A; B; b)∈ , for each occurrence b of an initial B-move in u and
(ii) u  (B; C)∈ ,
where u  (A; B; b), called the (A; B; b)-component of u, is the subsequence of u con-
sisting of moves from the arena A⇒B that are hereditarily justi9ed by the occurrence
b (note that the subsequence inherits the pointers associated with the moves); similarly
u  (B; C), called the (B; C)-component of u, is the subsequence of u consisting of
moves from the arena B⇒C. We can now de9ne the composite strategy  ;  over
A⇒C:
 ;  = {u  (A; C) : u ∈ ISeq(; )}:
In u  (A; C) the pointer of every initial A-move is to the unique initial C-move.
It is straightforward to verify that an interaction sequence u∈ ISeq(; ) is a di-
alogue with pointers over the anonymous arena 〈M; ; 〉 where M =(MA×M InitB +
MB)×M InitC +MC , the question–answer labelling  :M→{Q; A} is inherited from are-
nas A, B and C, and  ⊆ (M + {∗})×M is de9ned as
∗  c ⇔ ∗ C c;
c  (b; c′) ⇔ c = c′ ∧ ∗ B b;
(b; c)  ((a; b′); c′) ⇔ c = c′ ∧ b = b′ ∧ ∗ A a;
c  c′ ⇔ c C c′;
(b; c)  (b′; c′) ⇔ c = c′ ∧ b B b′;
((a; b); c)  ((a′; b′); c′) ⇔ c = c′ ∧ b = b′ ∧ a A a′:
(As is the case with moves of function space arenas, we shall refer to a move of the
form ((a; b); c) (say) simply as a copy of a.) Thus the nested level of an interaction
sequence is well-de9ned. We say that two moves in u∈ ISeq(; ) are from the same
subarena if both are from A, or both are from B, or both are from C.
Lemma 7. Let  and  be as before. Take any u∈ ISeq(; ):
(i) For any component u  , and for any m in u  , we have m is pending in u  
i; m is pending in u.
(ii) u satis>es Persistence and Well-Bracketing.
Proof. (i) By de9nition of function space arena, any pair of answer and question moves
in u such that one is explicitly justi9ed by the other are from the same subarena. From
this the thesis follows immediately.
(ii) By induction on the length |u| of u. The base case of |u|=0 is trivial. For
the inductive case, let u= vm. There are two subcases according to whether m is a
question or an answer. We shall just consider the former since the latter is similar. If
there is no pending answer in v then there is also no pending answer in the component
v   to which m belongs. Thus, by Persistence, m is justi9ed by a question, and so,
Persistence is satis9ed by m in u. Otherwise if there are pending answers in v, let a
130 C.-H.L. Ong, P. Di Gianantonio / Theoretical Computer Science 312 (2004) 121–142
be the last such. If a and m both belong to the same component , the thesis follows
immediately from (i): a is the last pending answer in v  , and, by Persistence of
justi9ed sequences in  and , m is explicitly justi9ed by a.
We now prove that it is impossible for a and m to belong to diOerent components.
Let a′ be the move following a and let m′ be the move preceding m. Then a′ must
be an answer (for if not a would not be pending) and m′ must be a question (for if
not a would be equal to m′). By the induction hypothesis, we can apply Lemma 4(i)
to v, and so, by Lemma 3(i′), a and m are at the same nested level l (say) in vm; by
Lemma 3(i), a′ and m′ are at the same level l− 1. Again by the induction hypothesis,
we can apply Lemma 4(ii) to v, and so, m′ is hereditarily justi9ed by a′ through
an alternating sequence of questions and answers; thus it follows that a′ and m′ are
from the same subarena. Now suppose, for a contradiction, a and m are in diOerent
components. Then it follows that one component is (B; C) and the other is (A; B; b) for
some occurrence b of an initial B-move, and so, a′ and m′ must be B-moves. Suppose
a is an A-move (say) and m a C-move. By the Switching Convention, 1 we have a′
is a P-move in A⇒B. Since a′ and m′ are at the same level, it follows, from the
induction hypothesis and axiom (3) of arena, that the question m′ is a P-move from
B in B⇒C; but the following move m in B⇒C switches to C, contradicting the
Switching Convention.
Notation: We write s6m for the pre9x of s that terminates at m; and write s¡m for
the pre9x of s that terminates at the move just before m.
We are now in a position to prove that the composition of (innocent) strategies is
well-de9ned and preserves CC.
Lemma 8. Suppose  and  are strategies over arenas A⇒B and B⇒C, respectively.
(i) The composite  ;  is a well-de>ned strategy over A⇒C.
(ii) If  and  are CC innocent, so is  ; .
Proof. (i): We need to show that the elements in  ; , which are justi9ed sequences
over A⇒C (see e.g. [8] for a proof), satisfy the three axioms of legal positions. The
argument for the 9rst can be found in [8]. For Persistence, take a justi9ed sequence
sq= uq  (A; C) from  ;  where q is a question. If there is a pending answer in s, it
follows from Lemma 7(i) that there is also a pending answer in u. Since uq satis9es
Persistence (thanks to Lemma 7(ii)), q is explicitly justi9ed by the last pending answer
a (say) in u, and by Lemma 7(i) a is also the last pending answer in s. Moreover,
suppose q is justi9ed in s by an answer a; we need to prove that a is pending in s.
Now (by the de9nition of function space arena) it follows that q is justi9ed in u by the
same answer a. Since u satis9es Persistence, a is pending in u, and so, by Lemma 7(i),
a is also pending in s.
(ii): Suppose  and  are CC innocent strategies. We show that the composite is
CC. (For a proof that the composite is innocent, see e.g. [8].) By the characterization
1 Switching convention: if m1m2 are consecutive moves in a legal position of A⇒B such that one is an
A-move and the other a B-move, then m2 is a P-move. I.e. only P is allowed to switch games.
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of CC in Lemma 6, it suSces to prove that even-length P-views in  ;  of the form
p0)0]0v, where |v|¿1, satisfy the condition given in the Lemma. We shall only give
the proof for the case of |v|=2 (since the inductive case is a tedious repetition of the
same argument):
If the odd-length P-view p0)0]0[1 ∈  ; , then p0)0]0[1(1 ∈  ; , for some (1 which
is explicitly justi9ed by )0.
Let u∈ ISeq(; ) be the least u such that p0)0]0 = u  (A; C) so that the last move
of u is ]0. W.l.o.g. suppose )0 is a C-move. There are two cases: either ]0 is a C-move
or it is an A-move. We shall consider the latter, since it is harder. Suppose )0 and ]0
are at levels l′ and l in u, respectively. By Lemma 3(ii), we have l′¿l. Set l0 = l′− l
which is even. By Lemma 3(i′), for each 16k¡l0, there is a move, which must be a
B-move, occurring between )0 and ]0 in u at level l+ k, and by Lemma 3(ii) the last
such at that level is an answer. Suppose u= u0)0b1 · · · bL]0.
Claim. The block of B-moves b1 · · · bL between )0 and ]0 consists of one move (which
must be an answer) per level, starting from l + l0 − 1 and going down to l + 1.
I.e. L= l0 − 1, and for each 16k6l0 − 1, bk is an answer at level l+ l0 − k.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose b1; b2; : : : ; bk , respectively are answers
at levels l+ l0 − 1; ; : : : ; l+ l0 − k but bk+1 is a question, which must be at the same
level as bk . Suppose bk−1 and bk are both from the component (say) (A; B; b) for
some occurrence b of an initial B-move, bk−1 is an O-answer and bk is a P-answer in
u  (A; B; b). By Lemma 4(ii), bk+1 is an O-question explicitly justi9ed by bk ; since
 is assumed to be CC, bk+2 is a P-question explicitly justi9ed by bk−1 at level
l + l0 − k − 1. Now continuing in this fashion, and by appealing to the assumption
that  and  are CC, we have u0]0b1 · · · bkbk+1 · · · b2kc∈ ISeq(; ), where for each
16i6k, the B-question b2k−i+1 is explicitly justi9ed by the answer bi, and c is a
C-question explicitly justi9ed by )0, which is a contradiction.
By assumption, [1 is explicitly justi9ed by ]0, and so, it is an A-move. It suSces
to prove that v= u[1d1 · · ·dl0−1(1 ∈ ISeq(; ), where (1 is a C-move which is at the
same level as, and so is explicitly justi9ed by, )0, and for each 16i6l0 − 1, di is a
B-question at level l+ i which is explicitly justi9ed by the B-answer bl0−i. We leave
this as a straightforward exercise for the reader.
3.3. A notion of relevance
We consider a notion of Relevance whereby P is not allowed to respond to an O-
question by engaging O inde9nitely in a dialogue at one level higher, nor is P allowed
to “give up”; instead he must answer the O-question eventually.
Denition 9. We say that a CC strategy  is relevant if
(1) for each P-view p)∈ , there is a P-move m such that p)m∈  and
(2) there is no in9nite sequence p(0)0(1)1 · · · such that for every n
p (0 )0 (1 )1 · · · (n )n ∈ :
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Theorem 10. If  and  are relevant CC strategies over arenas A⇒B and B⇒C
respectively then the composite  ;  is also a relevant CC strategy.
Proof. Thanks to Lemma 8, it remains to prove that the composite  ;  satis9es con-
ditions (1) and (2) of Relevance.
(1): Take a P-view p)∈  ; . Let u∈ ISeq(; ) be the least sequence such that
u)  (A; C)=p). W.l.o.g. suppose ) is an O-move in the component (B; C) (it fol-
lows that ) is a C-move). Since  is relevant and pu  (B; C)q)∈ , there is a P-move
m such that pu  (B; C)q)m∈ . There are two cases: m is either a C-move or a B-
move. If the former, p)m∈  ;  (see e.g. the analysis of the composition of inno-
cent strategies in [8]) and we are done. If the latter, let n be the largest such that
u)a1a2 · · · an ∈ ISeq(; ) and each ai is an answer. Note that n is a well-de9ned num-
ber (since the level of u)a1a2 · · · ai decreases as i increases, provided each ai is an
answer) and at least one by assumption. Now if some ai is a move in A⇒C (and
let i be the least such), we have p)ai ∈A⇒C are we are done. If not, by considering
the P-view pu)a1a2 · · · an  (B; C)q in  (w.l.o.g. assuming that an is an O-move in
the component (B; C)) which is relevant, we must have u)a1a2 · · · anqn+1 ∈ ISeq(; ),
for some question qn+1 which is explicitly justi9ed by an (by Persistence), and so,
qn+1 is a B-move. Now since both  and  are CC, it follows inductively that there
are B-questions qn+2; : : : ; q2n such that u)a1a2 · · · anqn+1 · · · q2n ∈ ISeq(; ) and for each
i¿1, the question qn+i is explicitly justi9ed by the answer an−i+1. Thus it follows that
u)a1a2 · · · anqn+1 · · · q2nq∈ ISeq(; ) for some question q which is explicitly justi9ed
by ), and so, q is a C-move and we are done.
(2): Suppose, for a contradiction, there is an in9nite sequence p(0)0(1)1 · · · such that
for every n, p(0)0(1)1 · · · (n)n ∈  ; . W.l.o.g. suppose (0 is an A-move in the com-
ponent (A; B; b) for some occurrence b of an initial B-move; it then follows that
)0; (1; )1; : : : are all A-moves (since they are all hereditarily justi9ed by (0). By de9-
nition of composition, there is an in9nite sequence u(0u0)0(1u1)1 · · · such that for each
n, u(0u0)0(1u1)1 · · · (nun)n ∈ ISeq(; ). Thus, by 9rst projecting to (A; B; b) and then
taking the P-view, we have
puq (0 )0 (1 )1 · · · (n )n ∈ 
for each n, which contradicts the assumption that  is relevant.
3.4. The category L
We de9ne a category called L whose objects are arenas and whose maps A→B
are relevant CC strategies of the arena A⇒B. It is completely straightforward to ver-
ify that L is Cartesian closed (see e.g. [8] for a similar proof): the terminal object
is the empty arena; for any arenas A and B, their Cartesian product is given by
A×B, and the function space arena is A⇒B. However lifting (−)⊥ is not func-
torial (see Remark 11). We write Lrec for the subcategory whose objects are are-
nas but whose maps are recursive (in the sense of [8, Section 5.6]) relevant CC
strategies.
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4. Universality and full abstraction
We introduce an arena D, which is the initial solution of the recursive equation
D= [D⇒D]⊥, and interpret (closed) -terms as relevant CC strategies over it. By an
analysis of the structure of P-views over D, we obtain the main result of the paper:
Every recursive relevant CC strategy over D is the denotation of a closed -term;
further two terms have the same denotation iO they have the same Levy–Longo tree.
4.1. The model
Following [14], for arenas A and B, we de9ne the subarena relation A E B by
(1) MA ⊆ MB,
(2) A= B  MA,
(3) A=B ∩ (MA + {∗})×MA.
Equipped with the ordering E, the collection of arenas is a (large) dcpo A, with
least element the empty arena 1, and directed suprema given by taking component-
wise union. Take any operation F on arenas. If F is monotone and continuous with





Let F be the arena operation A → [A⇒A]⊥. It is straightforward to verify that F is
monotone and continuous. We de9ne the arena D as the initial solution of the recursive
equation D=F(D) in the category A. The arena graph of D (see Fig. 1) is a 9nitely
branching tree that satis9es the following:
(1) Every question justi9es a unique answer, and at most one question.











































































Fig. 1. The arena graph of D.
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Let app be the “evaluation map” [D1⇒D2]⊥×D3→D4 (we label the four copies
of D) which is the following strategy: P responds to the opening move with the initial
move of [D⇒D]⊥, and responds to the answer justi9ed by the latter with the answer
justi9ed by the opening move; and thereafter P plays copycat between D2 and D4, and
between D1 and D3. We write f for the transpose in the following bijection between
L-maps:
f :C ×D→ D
Pf :C →t [D⇒ D]⊥
;
which is natural in C, where  :C→t B denotes a convergent strategy in the sense that
 responds to the opening move immediately with an answer. As app is the inverse
transpose of the identity map on [D⇒D]⊥, we have
〈idC; a〉 ; f = 〈 Pf; a〉 ; app :C → D (1)
for any a :C→D in L. We de9ne the L-map <&  s = :Dn→D, where &= {x1; : : : ; xn}
is a 9nite set of variables including the free variables of s, by recursion over s as
follows:
<&  xi = = i : Dn → D;
<&  st = = 〈 <&  s =; <&  t = 〉 ; app;
<&  x:s = = <&; x  s =;
where i is the standard projection map, and 〈−;−〉 is pairing. Standardly (see e.g. [3])
this gives a model of the (Lazy) -calculus.
Remark 11. (i) There is no way lifting can be functorial in a category of arenas
and conditionally copycat strategies. Take a CC strategy  :A→B. Since id⊥= id :
A⊥→B⊥, ⊥ is forced to respond to the initial move qB in B⊥ with the initial move
qA in A⊥, and to respond to the P-view qBqAaA with the move aB. Now almost all
P-views in ⊥ contain an O-answer aA immediately followed by a P-answer aB, and
so, by Lemma 6, ⊥ is almost always constrained to play copycat, whereas  may
not be restricted in the same way. (It is easy to construct concrete instances of 
and ⊥.)
(ii) Functoriality of lifting is not necessary for the construction of our model. The do-
main equation D= [D⇒D]⊥ is solved in the auxiliary category A, and lifting is func-
torial in this category. All we need are two (relevant, CC) strategies, upD :D→D⊥ and
dnD :D⊥→D, such that dnD◦upD = idD, which are easily constructible for any arena D.
(iii) Indeed functoriality of lifting is inconsistent with our model being fully abstract.
A feature of our model is that there are “few” denotable strategies that are compact-
innocent; indeed the innocent strategy denoted by a closed term is compact if and only
if the term is unsolvable of a 9nite order (Lemma 16). Now we know from [3, Lemma
9.2.8] that projections on the 9nite approximations Dn of the fully abstract model D
of the Lazy Lambda Calculus are not -de9nable. If all the domain constructions in-
volved in the domain equation D= [D⇒D]⊥ were functorial, these projections would
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be maps that are de9nable categorically, which would imply that our model is not fully
abstract.
Remark 12. D is a submodel of McCusker’s game model for the lazy -calculus, DM ,
as constructed in [13].
Here we sketch a proof in stages (and explain what we mean by submodel) as
follows:
(1) First we prove that the two models are de9ned over the same arena; an important
diOerence is that DM contains plays in violation of Persistence.
(2) We then de9ne an embedding e of strategies in D to strategies in DM , and
(3) prove that the embedding e preserves application.
By analogy with McCusker’s category of games and innocent strategies, we de9ne
an L-game to be a pair consisting of an object of L (i.e. an arena) and the set of legal
positions over it. We can now de9ne a relation J between L-games and the innocent
games in the sense of [13]. We say that AJA′ just in case A and A′ are de9ned over
the same arena, A′ contains all the plays in A, and A′ does not contain any play in
which there is (an occurrence of) an answer that justi9es more that one question. It
is straightforward to show that the relation J is preserved by lifting and the functions
space construction. As both models are appropriate limit constructions, it follows that
DJDM .
It is straightforward to check that Persistence is satis9ed by every O-move that
occurs in a P-view. Since an innocent strategy is completely determined by the set of
P-views it contains, for any pair of games A and A′ such that AJA′, given a strategy 
over A, we de9ne its embedding eA;A′() to be the strategy over A′ given by the set of
P-view in . (To save writing, we shall omit the subscripts in eA;A′ in the following.)
The composition of strategies depends on the set of plays in the strategies. Now
the strategy e() may contain plays that violate Persistence. We need to prove that
e preserves the composition of strategies. That is to say, we need to prove that
for every three pairs of games A; A′; B; B′; C and C′ such that AJA′, BJB′ and
C JC′, and for every pair of strategies  :A⇒B and  :B⇒C in L, the equality
e(); e()= e(; ) holds. We shall establish e(); e() ⊆ e(; ) by regarding strategies
as sets of P-views; the opposite inclusion is omitted as it is straightforward. Take a P-
view p in e(); e(); there exists an interaction sequence u∈ ISeq(e(); e()) such that
p= u  (A′; C′). We claim that all moves in u  (B′; C′) and u  (A′; B′; b) (for each b)
satisfy Persistence:
• P-moves in u  (A′; B′; b) and u  (B′; C′) satisfy Persistence since each such move
is determined by either the strategy  or .
• O-moves of A′ in u  (A′; B′; b) and of C′ in u  (B′; C′) satisfy Persistence since
p= u  (A′; C′) is a P-view.
• O-moves of B′ in u  (A′; B′; b) and in u  (B′; C′) satisfy Persistence since these are
P-moves when viewed in the other projection.
It follows that u  (B′; C′)∈  and u  (A′; B′; b)∈  and so p∈ ; , and hence, we
have p∈ e(; ) as desired.
Thus we have an embedding eD;DM from D to DM that preserves application i.e. D
is a submodel of DM .
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Lemma 13 (Adequacy). For any closed term s, we have < s ==⊥, the strategy that
has no response to the opening move, if and only if s is strongly unsolvable (i.e. s is
not )-convertible to a -abstraction).
Proof. By adapting a standard method in [4] and as a corollary of an approximation
theorem.
For any -term s, if the set {i¿0 :∃t:  s= x1 · · · xi: t} has no supremum in
N, we say that s has order in>nity; otherwise if the supremum is n, we say that s
has order n. A term that has order in9nity is unsolvable (e.g. yk, for any 9xpoint
combinator y).
4.2. Structure of P-views
We aim to describe P-views of D in terms of blocks (of moves) of two kinds, called
* and ), respectively.
For n¿0, an *n-block is an alternating sequence of O-questions and P-answers of
length 2n+1, beginning with an O-question, such that each element except the 9rst is
explicitly justi9ed by the preceding element, as follows:
[0 ] [1 ] · · · [n−1 ] [n:
We call [i the ith question of the block.
For m¿0, i¿0 and j¿1, a )(i; j)m -block is an alternating sequence of P-questions
and O-answers of length 2m+ 1, beginning with a P-question, such that each element
except the 9rst is explicitly justi9ed by the preceding element, as follows:
(0 ) (1 ) · · · (m−1 ) (m:
We call (i the ith question of the block. The superscript (i; j) in )
(i; j)
m encodes the
target of the justi9cation pointer of (0 relative to the P-view of which the )
(i; j)
m -block
is a part, about which more anon. A P)(i; j)m -block is just a )
(i; j)
m -block followed by a ),
which is explicitly justi9ed by the last question (m. An *-block is just an *n-block, for
some n; similarly for a )-block.
Suppose we have a P-view of the form
p = A1B1A2B2 · · ·AkBk · · · ;
where each Ak is an *nk -block and each Bk is a )
(ik ; jk )
lk
-block. The superscript (ik ; jk)
encodes the fact that the 0th question of the block Bk is explicitly justi9ed by the jk th
question of the block Ak−ik . Thus we have the following constraints: for each k¿1
06 ik ¡ k ∧ 16 jk 6 nk−ik : (2)
The lower bound of jk is 1 rather than 0 because, by de9nition of D (see Fig. 1),
the only move that the 0th question of any *-block can justify is an answer. Note that
since p is a P-view by assumption, for each k¿2, the 0th question of the *-block Ak
is explicitly justi9ed by the last question of the preceding )-block.
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subject to constraints (2), there is exactly one P-view p of D that has the shape +.
Therefore there is no harm in referring to the P-view p simply as +, and we shall do
so in the following.
Lemma 15 (P-view characterization). Suppose, for some m¿0, the even-length P-view
W = *n1)l1 · · · *nm)lm
is in a relevant CC strategy  over D. Then exactly one of the following holds:
(1) For each j¿0, W*j ∈ dom(f).
(2) There is some n¿0 such that W*n ∈ \dom(f).
(3) There are some nm+1¿0, some 06i6m and some 16j6nm+1−i such that f :




Moreover by CC we have W*nm+1 P)
(i; j)
l ]C ∈ dom(f), for each (odd-length) copycat
block C, as de>ned in Lemma 6.
Proof. Suppose for some m¿0, the even-length W ∈ . Then W [, where [ is explicitly
justi9ed by the last P-question, is a P-view in . Clearly if neither (1) nor (2) above
holds, then there is some nm+1¿0 such that f maps W*nm+1 to a P-question which
(because the current P-view has no pending O-answer) is explicitly justi9ed by an
O-question that is currently P-visible i.e. by one of the O-questions (except the 0th)
in one of the m + 1 preceding *-blocks. Formally we have f :W*nm+1 → ((i; j) where
06i6m and 16j6nm+1−i as required. The rest of (3) above follows immediately
from Relevance and by Lemma 6, respectively.
Lemma 16. The denotation of any closed term in D is a compact innocent strategy
if and only if it is unsolvable of a >nite order.
Proof. It suSces to prove that
(1) unsolvables of in9nite order and
(2) solvable terms
are denoted by non-compact strategies. For the 9rst, note that every 9nite-length legal
position consisting of alternating questions and answers, such that all of which are
at level 0, is in the denotation of any unsolvable of order in9nity. For any solvable
term s which has head normal form x1 · · · xn:xit1 · · · tm (say) where n¿1 and m¿0,
we observe that the P-view *n)
(0; i)
m )] is in < s =. The denotation is a CC strategy, by
Lemma 6; hence it is not compact.
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4.3. Levy–Longo trees
We give an informal de9nition of LT(s), the Levy–Longo tree [11,12] of a -term s:
• Suppose s is unsolvable: If s has order in9nity then LT(s) is the singleton tree ;
if s has order n¿0 then LT(s) is the singleton tree ⊥n.
• Suppose s=) x1 · · · xm:ys1 · · · sn where m; n¿0. Then LT(s) is the tree:
It is useful to 9x a variable-free representation of Levy–Longo trees. We write
N= {0; 1; 2; : : :} and N+ = {1; 2; 3; : : :}. A Levy–Longo pre-tree is a partial function T
from the set (N+)∗ of occurrences to the following set of labels:
N× (N×N+)×N ∪ {⊥i : i ¿ 0} ∪ {};
such that
(1) dom(T ) is pre9x-closed.
(2) Every occurrence that is labelled by any of ⊥i and  is maximal in dom(T ).
(3) If T (l1 · · · lm)= 〈 n; (i; j); b 〉 then:
(a) l1 · · · lml∈ dom(T )⇔ 16l6b, and
(b) 06i6m+ 1, and
(c) If i6m then T (l1 · · · lm−i) is a triple, the 9rst component of which is at
least j.
(The case of i=m+1 corresponds to the head variable at l1 · · · lm being a free variable.)
We say that the pre-tree is closed if T (l1 · · · lm)= 〈 n; (i; j); b 〉⇒ i6m. A Levy–Longo
tree is the Levy–Longo pre-tree given by LT(s) for some -term s. In the following,
we shall only consider closed pre-trees and trees.
To illustrate the variable-free representation, consider the following (running)
example.
Example 17. Set s= x1x2: x1⊥1(y1y2y3:y2(z:x1)). The Levy–Longo tree LT(s),
as shown in the 9gure below
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is the partial function:

 → 〈2; (0; 1); 3〉
1 → ⊥1
2 → 〈3; (0; 2); 1〉
3 → 
21 → 〈1; (2; 1); 0〉
Take LT(s) : 21 → 〈 1; (2; 1); 0 〉 which encodes the label z:x1 of the tree at occurrence
21: the 9rst component is the nested depth of the -abstraction: in this case it is a
1-deep -abstraction (i.e. of order one); the second component (i; j) says that the head
variable (x1 in this case) is a copy of the jth (in this case, 9rst) variable bound at the
occurrence i (in this case, two) levels up; and the third component is the branching
factor at the occurrence, which is 0 in this case i.e. the occurrence 21 has 0 children.
Thanks to Lemma 15, we can now explain the correspondence between relevant
CC strategies over D and closed Levy–Longo pre-trees; we shall write the pre-tree
corresponding to the strategy  as T. Using the notation of Lemma 15, the action
of the strategy  on a P-view p∈  of the shape *n1)(i1 ; j1)l1 · · · *nm)
(im; jm)
lm [ determines
precisely the label of T at the occurrence l1 · · · lm. Corresponding to each of the three
cases in the Lemma 15, the label de9ned at the occurrence is as follows:
(1) ,
(2) ⊥n where n¿0 and
(3) 〈 n; (i; j); b 〉.
It is easy to see the occurrence in question is maximal in dom(T) in cases 1 and 2. In
case 3, i.e., T(l1 · · · lm)= 〈 n; (i; j); b 〉, from the P-view p, we can work out the label
of T at each pre9x l1 · · · lk (where k6m) of the corresponding occurrence, which is
〈 nk+1; (ik+1; jk+1); bk+1 〉, as determined by
f : *n1)
(i1 ;j1)
l1 · · · *nk )






we set 〈 nm+1; (im+1; jm+1); bm+1 〉= 〈 n; (i; j); b 〉. Note that bk+1 is well-de9ned because
of Relevance. Thus the domain of T is pre9x-closed. Take any k6m. For each
16l6bk+1, we have the odd-length P-view
*n1)
(i1 ; j1)
l1 · · · *nk )




l [ ∈ 
and so, we have l1 · · · lkl∈ dom(T)⇔ 16l6bk+1. Finally, we must have jk+16
nk−ik+1 , as the pointer of the 0th (P-)question of the )-block )
(ik+1 ;jk+1)
l is to the jk+1th
question of the *-block *nk−ik+1 .
To summarize, we have shown:
Lemma 18 (Correspondence). There is a one-to-one correspondence between relevant
CC strategies over D and closed Levy–Longo pre-trees.
Example 19. Take the term s= x1x2: x1⊥1(y1y2y3:y2(z:x1)) in the preceding ex-
ample. In the following table, we illustrate the exact correspondence between the
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relevant CC strategy < s = denoted by s on the one hand, and the Levy–Longo tree
LT(s) of the term on the other.
P-views in < s = Occurrences Labels of LT(s)
*2 P)
(0;1)
3 → ]  〈2; (0; 1); 3〉
*2)
(0;1)





1 → ] 2 〈3; (0; 2); 1〉
*2)
(0;1)







0 → ] 21 〈1; (2; 1); 0〉
For each P-view shown above, note that the subscripts in bold give the corresponding
occurrence in the Levy–Longo tree, and the label at that occurrence is speci9ed by the
(subscripts and the superscript in the) block that is framed. The 9rst, third and 9fth
P-views de9ne the “boundary” beyond which the copycat response sets in.
Using an argument similar to the proof of [4, Theorem 10.1.23], we can show that
every recursive closed Levy–Longo pre-tree T is the Levy–Longo tree of some closed
-term. Thus we have:
Theorem 20 (Universality). (i) The denotation of a closed -term s is a recursive,
relevant, CC strategy which corresponds to LT(s) in the sense of Lemma 18.
(ii) Every recursive, relevant, CC strategy over D is the denotation of a closed
-term. I.e. for every ∈ Lrec(1;D) there is some s∈0o such that < s == .
As a consequence, two closed -terms have the same denotation in D iO they have
the same Levy–Longo tree.
4.4. Full abstraction for the Lazy Lambda Calculus
From the Universality Theorem, it is a small step to show that the model is fully
abstract for the Lazy Lambda Calculus. Programs of the (pure) Lazy Lambda Calculus
[2,15] are closed -terms, and values are closed abstractions (ranged over by v; v′). The
evaluation relation ⇓ is a binary relation over closed -terms, de9ned by induction over
the rules:
x:p ⇓ x:p
s ⇓ x:p p[t=x] ⇓ v
st ⇓ v :
We write s⇓ for the predicate ∃v:s⇓ v. We de9ne observational preorder ❁∼ as follows:
for -terms s and t, s ❁∼ t if and only if for any context C[X ] such that both C[s] and
C[t] are programs, if C[s]⇓ then C[t]⇓. We write s ≈ t for s ❁∼ t and t ❁∼ s.
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Remark 21. Equivalently we can de9ne s ❁∼ t by either of the following:
(1) Closure by abstraction: For every closed context C[X ], if C[y1 · · ·ym:s]⇓ then
C[y1 · · ·ym: t]⇓, where {y1; : : : ; ym} is set of variables that occur free in either s
or t.
(2) Closure by substitution: For every closing substitution  of s and t (i.e. s and t
are closed), for every closed context C[X ], if C[s]⇓ then C[t]⇓.
Note that ❁∼ is a rich theory; e.g. we have
x:x (x⊥1⊥)⊥1 ≈ x:x (y:x⊥1⊥y)⊥1;
where ⊥ is any unsolvable term of order 0 such as (x:xx)(x:xx), and ⊥1 is any
unsolvable term of order 1 (see [3, p. 226] for a proof).
Set 2 to be 1⊥. We write  : 1→ 2 for the convergent strategy (i.e. P responds to the
opening question with the only answer). For any ;  :A→B in Lrec, we de9ne .  to
mean for every f : 1→A and every g :B→ 2 in Lrec, if f ;  ; g= then f ;  ; g=.
(This can be seen as the preorder generated by a notion of observables in the sense
of [8].) For any Lrec-map 4 : 1→D, we write 4⇓ to mean that 4 is convergent.
Lemma 22. For ;  :Dm→D in Lrec, we have .  if and only if for every
f : 1→Dm and every g :D→D in Lrec, if f ;  ; g⇓ then f ;  ; g⇓.
Proof. For “⇒”, we use the retraction map D→ 2; and for “⇐”, we note that every
Lrec-map D→ 2 extends by Conditionally Copycat to a map D→D.
Take -terms s and t such that &= {y1; : : : ; ym} is the set of variables that occur
free in either s or t. Using (2) of Remark 21 and by Lemma 13, we have s ❁∼ t iO for
every closing substitution , and for every closed context C[X ], if <  C[s] =⇓ then
<  C[t] =⇓. Now
<  C[s] = = 〈 <  (yi) = 〉 ; <&  s = ; < y  C[y] =:
Hence, by the Universality Theorem, we have s ❁∼ t iO for every f : 1→Dm and for
every g :D→D in Lrec, if f ; <&  s = ; g⇓ then f ; <&  t = ; g⇓, which, by Lemma 22,
is equivalent to <&  s = . <&  t =. To summarize, we have proved:
Theorem 23 (Full abstraction). For any -terms s and t such that & is the set of
variables that occur free in either s or t, we have
s ❁∼ t ⇔ <&  s = . <T  t =:
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